Definitely a valid concern and the Radicle DAO should ensure that it has some basic fail-safes in place to ideally avoid and, if necessary, quickly react to such worst case scenarios. The liquid delegation system is one such fail-safe because, at least in theory, it should allocate voting power based on initiative, reputation, and merit (“a good track record”), which includes keeping the broader objectives of the project in mind as opposed to just short-term financial interests. However, as your comment implies, a “good track record” may have a different meaning from the point of view of token holders vs. other stakeholders in the DAO.
I’m actually interested in studying this issue in more depth. I’ve been observing the governance processes of a number of DAOs for several years now and I can confirm that the potential failure modes of token-weighted governance are widely acknowledged and discussed, incl. the potential for “governance attacks” motivated by financial gain. At the same time, the vast majority of DAOs have been struggling with low voter turnout and there’s recently been a very clear tendency towards delegative and “optimistic” decision-making structures whereby specialized bodies are empowered to handle the day-to-day while token holders maintain re-delegation and/or veto authority. I’m sure there are many fly-by-night DAOs out there whose governance is indeed dominated by the financially short-termist interests of large token holders, but when it comes to the more prominent/credible DAOs, I’ve been noticing a considerable mismatch between theoretical concerns and the actual reality when it comes to voting. If anyone has notable counterexamples, please don’t hesitate to share here or via DM!